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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Dans ce papier, nous développons une méthode permettant de quantifier l’importance de la 
réglementation et de la structure des marchés sur la libéralisation du commerce et sur son 
succès. À ces fins, nous incorporons un secteur unique et imparfaitement compétitif pouvant 
intégrer différentes structures de marché dans un modèle standard de calcul d’équilibre 
général. Nous appliquons notre cadre d’analyse afin d’étudier l’impact de l’entrée d’un seul 
fournisseur étranger en Tunisie. Nous trouvons que si la réglementation du marché y garantit 
la compétition, le bien-être de la Tunisie peut augmenter de 0,65 %. Cependant, s’il y a 
formation d’un cartel entre le réseau domestique et l’entrant étranger, le bien-être de la 
Tunisie peut baisser de 0,25 %. Nos résultats démontrent que tout en libéralisant son secteur 
des télécommunications, la Tunisie bénéficierait de réformes visant des régulations pro-
compétitives. 
 
Mots clés : CGE (équilibre général calculable), compétition imparfaite, 




In this paper, we develop a method to quantify the importance of regulation and market 
structure on the success of trade liberalization. For this purpose, we incorporate a single 
imperfectly competitive service sector that can take on various market structures into a 
standard computational general equilibrium model. We apply our framework to analyze the 
impact of allowing a single foreign telecom provider to enter Tunisia. If the regulation 
environment guarantees competition, Tunisia’s welfare can improve up to 0.65 percent. If a 
cartel is formed between the domestic incumbent and foreign entrant, however, Tunisia’s 
welfare can drop up to 0.25 percent. Our results thus call for Tunisia among other developing 
countries to step up its procompetitive regulatory reforms while liberalizing its telecom 
sector. 
 
Keywords: service trade liberalization, regulation, market structure, 
imperfect competition, CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) 
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Within a long tradition of multilateral trade policy, negotiations on services
trade is the ‘new kid on the block.’ First introduced about 25 years ago
at the 1982 GATT Ministerial Meeting, the services policy agenda remains
a sideline to more traditional cross-border trade negotiations. This is sur-
prising as globalization relies on the availability of quality services such as
telecommunications, transportation, insurance, and ﬁnancial services. A
substantial multilateral agreement to liberalize trade in services would have
an impact far beyond that achievable through the further reduction of trade
barriers goods such agriculture, electronics, or textiles. Yet, the potential
gain from trade liberalization in services is not well understood.
While the importance of services is increasingly recognized by interna-
tional trade economists, empirical studies remain in scant supply for a num-
ber of reasons (Hoekman 2006).1 For one, it is diﬃcult to measure the
international ﬂow of services provision as multiple modes of delivery are in-
volved. For example, certain services (local telecommunications) can only
be provided through the establishment of a domestic presence. Yet, na-
tional income accounts do not systematically include data on employment,
output, or sales of foreign subsidiaries. Second, international activities in
key services industries are subject to restrictions on market entry, foreign
ownership, and other regulatory barriers. Quantifying the impact of these
barriers is more diﬃcult than would be implied by an estimation of a tariﬀ
or other ad valorem equivalent. Third, high ﬁxed costs and legal barriers
to entry in services sectors combine to make markets imperfectly competi-
tive. Liberalizing services in these imperfectly competitive markets may be
akin to inviting a foreign ﬁrm to join a cartel (Francois and Wooton 2001).
Foreign ﬁrms may share in the collection of real economic rents, and may
shift these rents abroad. The outcome of liberalization depends not only
on pre-reform conditions but also on the selection of new entrants and the
competitive behavior of the foreign licensees upon entry into the market.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical method to model the joint eﬀect
of regulation and market structure on services liberalization within a general
equilibrium context. The model is applied to the liberalization of telecom-
munications within a computable general equilibrium model of Tunisia.
Existing CGE studies on service trade liberalization have largely ne-
glected the role of market structure on the success of service trade liber-
alization due to theoretical complications related to introducing imperfect
1A notable exception is Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo (2006).
2competition into a CGE framework. To model service trade liberalization,
studies have generally incorporated tariﬀ equivalents of impediments to ser-
vice trade into standard CGE trade models.2 Brown, et al. (1996), for
example, convert Hoekman (1995)’s frequency indices into an ad-valorem
tariﬀ equivalent and use this approach to simulate service trade liberaliza-
tion in their multi-country Michigan Model of World Production and Trade.
Hertel (1999) approximates cross-border barriers with Francois and Hoek-
man’s (1999) gravity-equation estimates and simulates service trade liberal-
ization in the multi-country GTAP model. Dee and Hanslow (2001), Brown
and Stern (2001) and Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2004) take similar ap-
proaches in CGE models with endogenous FDI ﬂows.
This approach does not allow one to analyze the role of strategic behavior
and market structure on the success of service trade liberalization (Whalley,
2004). In the CGE models discussed above, it is assumed that the service
sectors are governed by perfect competition or large-group Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition both before and after service trade liberalization.
Service trade liberalization is modeled as the removal of the ad valorem
tariﬀ equivalents of the impediments of services trade. This approach is
inappropriate to analyze the eﬀects of trade liberalization in service sectors
where domestic regulation limits market entry to both domestic and foreign
providers for two reasons. First, especially in developing countries many
backbone services sectors such as telecommunications, ﬁnance and insurance
are governed by few large players. Second, recent service liberalization dis-
cussions have focused primarily on freeing up ownership restrictions rather
than necessarily allowing free entry per se (Low and Mattoo, 2000). If ser-
vice liberalization only leads to partial market entry without pro-competitive
regulatory reforms, then this entails a danger that the foreign ﬁrms form a
cartel with domestic ﬁrms. In that case, monopoly markups do not dis-
appear, while rents might be transferred abroad (Low and Mattoo, 2000;
Copeland, 2002). In a recent World Bank study, Mattoo and Sauv´ e (2003)
have thus concluded that the success of service trade liberalization is strongly
related to issues of market structure and domestic regulation.
2Hoekman (1995) developed a frequency indicator as an initial attempt to quantify
the presence of barriers based on the GATS schedule of commitments by country. While
this provides some indication of the extent of commitments, the index is not designed to
measure the level of barriers present. Francois and Hoekman (1999) derive a quantity-
based measure by ﬁtting a gravity model of bilateral services trade between the U.S. and
its trading partners. Discrepancies in predicted trade patterns are used to indicate the
severity of service trade barriers. Findlay and Warren (2000), ﬁnally, describe an ongoing
Australian services research project to create price-based measures of service trade barriers
by determining the wedge between price and marginal cost in service sectors.
3In a recent study, Konan and Maskus (2006) have conducted a ﬁrst
attempt to quantify the role of market structure on the success of service
trade liberalization in Tunisia. The authors take the simplifying assumption
that service sectors are governed by perfect competition, but they identify
that service trade barriers lead to two types of markups above world-best
marginal cost: an ineﬃciency markup since more eﬃcient foreign ﬁrms are
kept out of the domestic market, and a cartel markup because the trade
barriers reduce competition in the market. By comparing the welfare eﬀects
of service trade liberalization when the cartel markup disappears or remains,
they are able to provide initial quantitative insights into the role of market
structure on the success of service trade liberalization.
The problem of introducing imperfectly competitive market structures
other than Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition into CGE models is largely
theoretical. CGE models are based on input-output tables where industries
with diﬀerent elasticities of demand buy the same goods and services. To
derive an imperfectly competitive ﬁrm’s Lerner markup condition in such
models, one is required to calculate the general equilibrium demand elas-
ticities for all users and weight them appropriately. A recent contribution
from Hoﬀmann (2002) demonstrates the complexities that are involved with
calculating such Lerner markup rules under Cournot competition. He shows
that a ﬁrm uses a weighted average of the diﬀerent buyers’ general equilib-
rium elasticities of demand to maximize proﬁts, where the weights equal the
share sold to each buyer.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the role
of market structure in the liberalization of one single service sector. For
this purpose, we extend Hoﬀmann’s (2002) method by incorporating a sin-
gle imperfectly competitive services sector into a standard CGE framework
and deriving the Lerner markup conditions for multiple market structures:
monopoly, oligopoly, cartel and monopolistic competition. This extension
allows us to analyze the role of market structure on the eﬀect of partial ser-
vice trade liberalization in a single sector. Assume that in the benchmark
scenario only one or few domestic service providers operate in a services
sector. In the counterfactuals, the services sector is liberalized and one or
more licenses are provided to foreign service providers. If regulations can
enforce competition between the domestic and foreign providers, then the
telecommunications market structure turns into a Cournot oligopoly. If reg-
ulations are weak, then the domestic and foreign providers form a cartel. We
discuss the welfare eﬀects associated with the adoption of diﬀerent market
structures in such a framework.
In the second part of our paper, we introduce our method into a CGE
4model for Tunisia to investigate the possible welfare impacts of allowing one
foreign provider to enter Tunisia’s telecommunications sector. Our results
highlight the role that market structure plays in Tunisia’s telecommunica-
tions liberalization. According to our conservative estimates, the potential
welfare implications of telecom liberalization are clearly positive if compe-
tition can be guaranteed between the two providers. Tunisia’s welfare is
estimated to increase up to 0.65 percent if the foreign provider is more eﬃ-
cient and does not shift its proﬁts abroad. In contrast, telecom liberalization
can lead to a welfare deterioration of up to 0.25 percent if the two providers
collude and the foreign provider shifts its proﬁts abroad. Our results thus
call for Tunisia to step up its pro-competitive regulatory reforms while lib-
eralizing its telecom sector.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce an imper-
fectly competitive service sector that can adopt various market structures
into a standard CGE framework. In Section 3, we deﬁne the various welfare
eﬀects that can be associated with service trade liberalization. In Section
4, we apply our framework to telecommunications liberalization in Tunisia.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a CGE model with I−1 perfectly competitive sectors that produce
output Yi and one imperfectly competitive producer service sector that pro-
vides service Yz. Sectoral output is used both as an intermediate good by
sectors I and as a ﬁnal good by the representative consumer. We denote in-
termediate good use by superscript x and ﬁnal good use by superscript c. In
the imperfectly competitive producer service sector Yz, N service providers
each produce a single diﬀerentiated service zj. The service providers are
not necessarily symmetric and can be both domestic and foreign. Users per-
ceive a constant elasticity of substitution between each provider’s service,
and we thus represent total industry output Yz as a CES function of services













The elasticity of substitution between each variety is σ = 1
1−, where σ > 1.
Producer service sector Yz is one of a select group of H producer services
that positively aﬀect value-added productivity when used as an intermediate
5good (Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr, 2000; Markusen, Rutherford and
Tarr, 2005). Telecommunications, ﬁnance, insurance, business services and
transportation are generally considered to belong to this category. To model
this, we assume that industry i ∈ I’s composite producer services PSi is a



































where the constant elasticity of substitution between value added and pro-
ducer services is ρ = 1
1−γ. We call function Vi composite value added of
industry i. The production function for all sectors except for Yz is approxi-
mated with Leontief technologies using composite intermediate inputs from





































2.1 Market Structure and Lerner Markup Conditions
Firms in the imperfectly competitive services sector Yz do not price dis-
criminate, but sell their services to all sectors in the economy and to the
representative agent at the same price. Since each user might have a diﬀerent
demand elasticity for the service, a question arises which markup rule the
service provider will choose to maximize proﬁts. Hoﬀmann (2002) illustrates
that the general equilibrium Lerner markup condition for a service provider














where ωu and ωi stand for the share of services Z that are sold to the
representative consumer and sector i respectively. Φk
j,u and Φk
j,i represent
provider j’s perceived demand elasticity from the representative consumer
and from sector i in market structure k, respectively. Finally, cj(w,r) is
service provider j’s marginal cost of production, which depends on wages w
and the return to investment r.
To compute the general equilibrium markup condition for each ﬁrm j
under each market structure k, we will proceed by ﬁrst deriving the per-
ceived demand elasticity for intermediate inputs Φk
j,i and then calculating
the perceived demand elasticity for ﬁnal demand Φk
j,u. Finally, we will in-
sert all elasticities into equation (7) to derive the general equilibrium Lerner
markup condition.
2.1.1 Demand Elasticity for Intermediate Inputs
To determine Φk
j,i, we ﬁrst need to derive the price pk
j that service provider
j charges under each market structure k. To simplify notation, we will drop
superscript k throughout the derivation of the general equilibrium Lerner
markup condition. Let Py denote the domestic price of ﬁnal good output Yi
in sector i and pj denote the price received by service provider j in sector
Z. Note that Py and pj do not diﬀer from sector to sector since we assume
that there is no price discrimination. Since ﬁnal Yi production is assumed
perfectly competitive in our model, pj is the value of the marginal product










We derive pj in Appendix B. Using the price function, we can then derive
the inverse of the perceived elasticity of demand from sector i for provider
3In appendix A, we replicate the derivation of Hoﬀmann’s (2002) optimal markup
condition.








sv,i(1 − γ) if monopoly
sv,i(1 − γ) if cartel
1 −  − sj ((1 −  − sv,i (1 − γ)) if oligopoly















. A comparison across market structures identiﬁes that service
providers in a cartel each act as if they are a monopolist with a share
sj = 1. In addition, the inverse of the perceived demand elasticity un-
der a Cournot oligopoly reduces to the monopoly scenario when sj = 1 and
to the monopolistic competition scenario when sj = 0. Taking into account





= 1 −  − sk
j (1 −  − sv,i (1 − γ)), (9)
where sk
j is perceived to be equal to 1 under a cartel, and equals provider
j’s actual market share otherwise.
2.1.2 Demand Elasticity for Final Demand
We next derive provider j’s perceived demand elasticity from the ﬁnal con-
sumer. Since preferences of the representative consumer are represented by
a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the industry demand elasticity equals to
one. As a result, the perceived demand elasticity for each provider equals to
1 under a monopoly and a cartel. It is straightforward to demonstrate that




= 1 − (1 − sk
j), (10)
where sk
j is perceived to be equal to one under a cartel, and equals provider
j’s actual market share otherwise.4
4See Head and Mayer (1999) for proof.
82.1.3 General Equilibrium Lerner Markup Condition
We can now insert equations (9) and (10) into equation (7) to ﬁnd the






























j−1 reduces to σ
σ−1 if sk
j = 0. The markup rises in sk
j as long as the
realistic condition sv,i(1 − γ) +  ≥ 1 holds.






















2.2 Service Trade Liberalization
This model setup can be used to analyze the welfare eﬀects of service trade
liberalization in a country that in the benchmark is dominated by a small
number of domestic ﬁrms in a single producer services sector Yz. In the
counterfactual scenarios, the eﬀect of service trade liberalization can then
be quantiﬁed by allowing one or more foreign providers to enter the mar-
ket. If a pro-competitive regulatory environment is in place, the domestic
incumbent and foreign market entrant(s) strategically compete in quanti-
ties. Otherwise, competition is not ensured and the domestic incumbent
and foreign entrant(s) form a cartel. As such, this setup allows us to ana-
lyze the impact of regulation and market structure on the success of service
liberalization in the imperfectly competitive sector.
To structure our welfare analysis, we assume that providers from the
same country are identical. Foreign providers, however, may diﬀer from the
domestic incumbents in two respects. First, foreign providers may shift a
portion of their proﬁts abroad, while the domestic incumbent shifts all of its
proﬁts to the domestic representative agent. Second, foreign providers may
be more eﬃcient in the sense that they face a lower marginal cost cj(w,r).








(1 + ∆j)c∗(w,r), (14)
where ∆d ≥ ∆f ≥ 0. Similar to Konan and Maskus (2006), this implies that
the total price-cost wedge can be decomposed into two types of wedges. On




j−1 by limiting both domestic and foreign participants in certain service
sectors and thus hampering competition. On the other hand, the exclusion
of low-cost foreign suppliers from the market and the additional costs of
bureaucratic procedures create a cost ineﬃciency wedge 1 + ∆j. As we
shall see below, the size of the wedges play an important role on the welfare
impact of service trade liberalization.
The diﬀerences between domestic and foreign providers introduce a re-
alistic trade-oﬀ related to service trade liberalization: on the one hand,
service trade liberalization can be welfare improving since it provides users
with more variety (love-of-variety eﬀect), can induce more competition in
the sector (pro-competitive eﬀect), and can allow more eﬃcient foreign ﬁrms
to operate in the market (eﬃciency eﬀect). On the other hand, it can be wel-
fare reducing since the foreign providers may shift a portion of their proﬁts
abroad. We will now analyze the four welfare eﬀects separately.
Users of producer service Yz treat each new variety as an imperfect sub-
stitute from that of the domestic incumbent. This implies that service trade
liberalization leads to a positive love-of-variety eﬀect through a reduction
in the price of composite service Pz. To demonstrate this, suppose that
service trade liberalization induces n−1 foreign providers to enter the mar-
ket and form a cartel with the domestic incumbent. Assume that they
are equally eﬃcient as the domestic incumbent and that they shift all of
their proﬁts to the domestic representative agent. From equation (11), the
n−1 foreign providers will set their price equal to the domestic incumbent’s
pre-liberalization price. From equation (13), this implies that the price of




Service trade liberalization thus leads to a positive love-of-variety eﬀect.
A second positive welfare eﬀect that can be induced by service trade lib-
eralization is a pro-competitive eﬀect. To demonstrate this, suppose that the
n − 1 foreign providers that have entered the market compete in quantities
10instead of forming a cartel. In that case, each provider perceives to have
a market share sk
j < 1. From equation (12), this implies that Σk
j is larger
than under a cartel.5 From equation (13), this implies that the composite
service price Pz is smaller under Cournot competition than under cartel.
When competition is guaranteed, service trade liberalization thus leads to a
positive pro-competitive eﬀect.
A third positive welfare eﬀect that may be associated with service trade
liberalization is an eﬃciency eﬀect. To demonstrate this, suppose that the
n − 1 foreign service providers’ marginal cost of production is lower than
the domestic incumbent’s marginal cost of production: cf(w,r) < cd(w,r).
Since the market share of the foreign providers will be higher than the domes-
tic incumbent, the foreign providers will partially oﬀset the lower marginal
cost by charging a higher markup (see equation (11))). Nonetheless, the
general equilibrium price of the foreign providers is always lower than that
of the domestic incumbent: pf < pd. From equation (13), the composite
price Pz then is lower than in the scenario where the foreign providers are
as eﬃcient as the domestic incumbent. Service trade liberalization in that
case leads to a positive eﬃciency eﬀect.
Finally, a negative welfare impact may be associated with service trade
liberalization. If the foreign provider shifts its proﬁts abroad rather than to
the domestic representative agent, then this leads to a negative income eﬀect
for the representative consumer. In that case, service trade liberalization can
lead to a negative proﬁt-shifting eﬀect.
There are other welfare eﬀects associated with partial service trade lib-
eralization that we do not take into account in this paper. For example, if
the government competitively auctions oﬀ its licenses to foreign providers,
then this can create a positive license fee eﬀect. In this paper, we do not
consider the auctioning oﬀ of licenses by taking on the implicit assumption
that a government gives a license to a select (number of) foreign provider(s)
for free.
The opposing welfare eﬀects imply that in theory the welfare impact of
service trade liberalization is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of
the model. In the next section, we will apply our model to telecommunica-
tions liberalization in Tunisia to demonstrate the magnitudes of the various
eﬀects.
5This will be the case under the realistic condition that sv,i(1 − γ) +  ≥ 1.
113 Telecommunications Liberalization in Tunisia
Tunisia represents a good case study to investigate the impact of regula-
tion and market structure on the success of telecommunications liberal-
ization. Tunisia’s telecommunications sector is one of the least advanced
among developing countries in terms of market liberalization. The Tunisian
telecommunications market has long been characterized by the monopoly of
Tunisie Telecom and the extensive role of the government as policy-maker,
regulator and operator in the sector. Tunisie Telecom, also known as “Of-
ﬁce National des T´ el´ ecommunications” continues to be a 100% state-owned
company with a national monopoly on ﬁxed telephony services and on the
provision of internet infrastructure. Until recently, Tunisie Telecom also had
a monopoly on the mobile telephony through its subsidiary Tunicell. Only
in 2002 was the country’s ﬁrst private mobile telecommunications license
sold to the Egyptian consortium Orascom. As is illustrated in ﬁgure 1, this
makes Tunisia’s telecommunications sector one of the least advanced among
developing countries in terms of market liberalization. Tunisia’s telecom-
munications liberalization index in 1999 was below the average of the worst-
performing developing region in the world, that is, the MENA region.6 In
addition, although Tunisia has initiated reforms in the past six years, its
telecommunications liberalization index continues to fall far short of the av-
erage ratings achieved by developing countries with similar levels of GDP
per capita (Varoudakis and Rossotto, 2004).
[Figure 1 about here]
Tunisia’s lack of telecom liberalization has led to an underperforming tele-
com sector. As is depicted in Figure 2, Tunisia’s ﬁxed line penetration
rate was similar to other Lower Middle-Income Countries between 1980 and
the early 1990s. From 1994, however, Tunisia has lagged behind since. In
addition, the mobile phone penetration rate in Tunisia has continuously
remained below that of other Lower Middle-Income Countries. For these
reasons, telecom liberalization holds a considerable potential for improv-
ing not only Tunisia’s sectoral performance, but also its overall economic
performance.
6The telecommunications liberalization index was constructed by Varoudakis and
Rossotto (2004). It measures degrees of liberalization according to: (i) degree of ef-
fective competition; (ii) openness to FDI in telecommunications; and (iii) pro-competitive
regulation and independence of regulatory body.
12[Figure 2 about here]
The Tunisian government has recognized this potential and has commit-
ted to a cautious program of telecommunications liberalization. In 1997,
it was one of the 56 signees of the World Trade Organization Agreement
of Basic Telecommunications Services, thus committing itself to gradually
opening up its telecommunications sector to foreign competition. In accor-
dance to the Agreement, Tunisia committed to permitting telex and data
transmission competition from 1999, mobile telephone and paging, frame
relay, and teleconferencing from 2000, and local telephone competition in
2003.7 However, Tunisia was less inclined to make binding commitments to
pro-competitive regulatory reforms. During the GATS Telecommunications
negotiations, Tunisia was one of the few signees that refrained from sign-
ing on to the Reference Paper, which committed members to a schedule of
pro-competitive regulatory reforms.
In January 2001, Tunisia enacted a new Communications Code (Law
n. 2001-1), which would regulate the telecommunications sector. The law
enabled the opening-up of the market to private companies by introduc-
ing a licensing regime for the supply of telecommunications services and
networks. In addition, the Code created two regulatory agencies: the Na-
tional Instance of Telecommunications (NIT) and the National Agency for
Frequency (NAF). The NIT is in charge of the regulation of the telecommu-
nications sector and the NAF is in charge of spectrum management. But,
once again, the Code falls short of setting up an independent regulatory
agency since signiﬁcant lawful capacities are left to the Ministry of Commu-
nications Technologies with regard to licence awarding, dispute settlements
and application of sanctions.
In summary, Tunisia’s telecom sector is currently dominated by a large
domestic player. The Tunisian government is aware of the potential beneﬁts
that telecom liberalization may enhold and is taking initial steps to liberalize
the market. It is wary of committing to full-ﬂedged liberalization, however,
and has been reluctant to embrace signiﬁcant regulatory reforms.
The model framework that we have developed in Section 2 is can provide
a valuable quantitative analysis of the macro and sectoral implications of
partial telecom liberalization in Tunisia. In addition, we are able to quantify
the dangers associated with neglecting adequate regulatory reforms, thus
7For all services, foreign ownership was capped at 49%, and foreign ownership of Tunisie
Telecom was only permitted to 10% beginning in 2002.
13helping to shape policy recommendations. In the next section, we discuss
the data and model structure that we use to conduct our analysis.
3.1 Model Structure and Benchmark Data
To introduce Section 2’s theoretical model into a CGE framework for Tunisia,
we need to take on a number of behavioral assumptions concerning Tunisia’s
telecommunication sector. First, we assume that the telecom sector is the
only imperfectly competitive sector in Tunisia and that it in the benchmark
is governed by a domestic monopoly. Second, we assume that the telecom
sector is one of ﬁve producer services sector next to ﬁnance, insurance, busi-
ness services and transportation. Third, we use Konan and Maskus’ (2006)
estimate that the price-cost wedge in Tunisia’s telecom sector is 30%.
As is explained above, the price-cost wedge can be decomposed into two
types of wedges: a cartel wedge and a cost ineﬃciency wedge. Since we do
not have the empirical information to determine the relative size of these
two wedges, we assume that in the benchmark both wedges are of equal
weight. In other words, the domestic monopolist in the benchmark faces a
marginal cost that is 15% above the world’s best practice (cost ineﬃciency
wedge) and a cartel wedge of 15%.
The nesting structure of the Tunisia CGE model builds on the theoretical
framework built in Section 2 and is depicted in Figure 3. The list of the main
equations is provided in Appendix C. We assume that all sectors other than
the telecom sector is characterized by constant returns to scale and perfect
competition, implying that prices equal marginal cost of output. In all
sectors, production functions are approximated with Leontief technologies
using composite intermediate inputs and composite value added. Composite
value added is approximated with a CET technology using producer services
and real value added. A Cobb-Douglas production function describes the
substitutability between labor and capital inputs in producing value added.
Intermediate inputs and ﬁnal goods are diﬀerentiated by country of origin
according to the Armington assumption, so that export and import prices
diﬀer across regions. The three trading regions are the European Union
(EU), the Arab League Countries (MENA) and the rest of the world (ROW).
[Figure 3 about here]
In each sector, demand for domestically produced and imported goods is rep-
resented by a CES function, and intermediate imports are also diﬀerentiated
14across regional sources of supply in a CES structure. Similarly, industries
supply regionally diﬀerentiated goods to both domestic and foreign mar-
kets (exports). Production follows a nested two-stage constant elasticity of
transformation (CET) function. Total output is ﬁrst calculated as the sum
of domestic supply and total exports, with the latter then being allocated
across the same destination regions according to a sub-CET function. Cap-
ital and labor are assumed to be freely mobile across sectors, whereas the
stock of factor endowments are endogenous, implying that our simulations
pertain to long-run outcomes of telecom liberalization.
A representative consumer maximizes a nested CES utility function with
a corresponding multi-staged budget constraint. In the ﬁrst stage, the con-
sumer decides how much to spend on goods from each sector, given the bud-
get constraint. Income elasticities across sectors are set at unity as given by
a Cobb-Douglas (CD) utility nest. In the second nest, the consumer deter-
mines domestic and aggregate import expenditures in each sector according
to a CES function. Then given a budget for imports, the consumer selects
purchases of imports from each region. These latter functions also charac-
terize the split between government consumption and investment spending
on domestic and imported goods and services. The representative consumer
receives income from primary factors (labor and capital), net transfers from
the government, the current-account deﬁcit, and any net economic rents
from the operation of restrictions on telecom trade.
Two standard closure rules are imposed: the savings-investment balance
and a ﬁxed current-account balance. The savings-investment balance is
based on the assumption that the capital stock is exogenously ﬁxed at the
benchmark level. This stock is ﬁnanced through forced consumer savings
that act as a direct (lump-sum) tax. The interest rate (an index price of the
composite capital stock) is endogenous and determined by factor-demand
conditions. The current-account balance is the sum of the merchandise
trade balance, the services balance, net foreign worker remittances, and
(negative) net payments on foreign capital. We assume that foreign reserves
will be held constant so that the current account will be just oﬀset by (the
negative of) the capital account. The current-account balance itself is held
constant in real terms throughout the simulations. Income from foreign
remittances less foreign capital payments enters as an exogenous addition
to the representative agent’s income. To hold the current-account balance
ﬁxed while international prices are constant requires a balancing item. This
is accomplished by means of a change in the home “real exchange rate,”
which refers implicitly to a change in the home price index (generated by
changes in price of home-produced goods) suﬃcient to sustain a constant
15current-account balance as import and export volumes change.
The government budget deﬁcit is a deduction in available income for the
representative agent, constituting a transfer to government consumption.
The deﬁcit is held ﬁxed during our simulations. Thus, if a policy reform
causes prices to fall, thereby reducing the tax revenues required to ﬁnance
government expenditures, this tax saving is transferred to the representative
agent. At the same time, if trade liberalization results in lost tariﬀ revenues,
the revenues are recouped by means of allowing household lump-sum taxes
to vary endogenously.
The data required for the CGE model consist of a Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) and of other parameters such as import and export trade
ﬂows by region and elasticities of substitution and transformation. The core
input-output model is the 1995 table provided on a diskette by the Institut
National de la Statistique (INS). The 56 sector table was combined with
the INS Les Comptes de la Nation (1998) report and then assembled into a
consistent set of relationships between intermediate demand, ﬁnal demand
and value-added to produce the SAM. In Table 1, we use this dataset to
present each industry’s telecom usage intensity, producer service usage in-
tensity and labor intensity. The industries are ranked in descending order
by telecom usage intensity (column 2). The ten industries with the highest
telecom input as share of sectoral output all are service sectors. Agricul-
ture, automobile & trucks and food are the three industries with the lowest
telecom usage intensity.
[Table 1 about here]
Trade and tariﬀ data were aggregated to the input-output sectoral basis
using import weights consistent with the concordance between the input-
output table and the tariﬀ classiﬁcation. Tariﬀ rates were determined by
collections data for 1995 and vary across regions due to duty drawback
provisions as well as preferential treatment of the EU and the Arab League.
There are no data on tariﬀ collections on services, reﬂecting the absence of
formal trade taxes, and we take their tariﬀ rates to be zero. This treatment
is the same as that in Chatti (2000), while Brown, Deardorﬀ and Stern
(1997) assume there are no barriers to trade in Tunisian services.
More information about the data can be found in Konan and Maskus
(2006). In addition, we have made the data available for the GTAP model
version 6 (Konan and Van Assche, 2005).
16Because there is little empirical evidence on relevant elasticities for the
Tunisian market, we make standard assumptions about their values. In
particular, labor-capital substitution is set at unity in a Cobb-Douglas value-
added production function. Benchmark trade elasticities are drawn from
Rutherford, Rutstrom and Tarr (1995) and Konan and Maskus (2000). The
trade elasticities are 2.0 for substitution between domestic and imported
goods, 5.0 for substitution among regional imports and for transformation
between domestic output and exports, and 8.0 for transformation among
regional export destinations. We also assume that the trade elasticities are
0.5 for services.
3.2 Impact of Telecom Liberalization
To estimate the impact of telecom liberalization in Tunisia, we analyze the
eﬀect of allowing a single foreign provider to enter Tunisia’s telecom market.
We only focus on the entry of one foreign provider for two reasons. First,
given that we have no information on the size of the ﬁxed cost that a foreign
entrant would face in the Tunisian telecom market, we cannot determine how
many providers would be able to enter in free-trade equilibrium. Second, as
Low and Mattoo (2000) have indicated, recent service liberalization discus-
sions have focused primarily on freeing up ownership restrictions rather than
necessarily allowing free entry per se. As a result, there is a strong policy
and academic interest in understanding the impact of partial service trade
liberalization where only few ﬁrms are allowed to enter a service sector.
We deﬁne the counterfactual telecom liberalization scenarios through
a combination of three factors. First, depending on the regulatory envi-
ronment, the foreign provider and the domestic incumbent can form two
diﬀerent market structures. If the regulatory environment is suﬃciently pro-
competitive, we assume that both providers compete in quantities (Cournot
duopoly). If the regulatory environment is not suﬃciently pro-competitive,
the two providers form a cartel. In that case, the foreign entrant is assumed
to set its price equal to the price that the domestic incumbent initially
charged for its services, thus splitting up the market in half. Second, the
foreign provider does not necessarily face the same cost structure as the
domestic incumbent. To take this into account, we assume that the foreign
entrant may face one of two marginal costs. On the one hand, he may face
the same marginal cost as the domestic incumbent (symmetric costs). In
this case, the foreign entrant also faces a marginal cost that is 15% above
the world’s best-practice marginal cost. On the other hand, he may face a
lower marginal cost than the domestic incumbent (asymmetric costs). In
17that case, the foreign entrant does not face the cost-ineﬃciency wedge that
the domestic incumbent faces, but rather faces the world’s best-practice
marginal cost. This implies that the foreign entrant is 15% more eﬃcient
than the domestic incumbent. Finally, the foreign ﬁrm does not necessarily
shift all of its proﬁts to the domestic representative agent. In our counterfac-
tual scenarios, we focus on the two extremes where the foreign entrant shift
all of its proﬁts abroad or shift all of its proﬁts to the domestic representative
agent.
By combining these three factors, we end up with 23 = 8 counterfactual
scenarios. In Table 2, we depict the impact of telecom liberalization on the
performance of the telecom sector, the macro-economy and on household
welfare for these 8 counterfactual telecom liberalization scenarios.
[Table 2 about here]
Scenario 1 in Table 2 depicts the telecom liberalization scenario where an
equally eﬃcient foreign entrant competes in quantities with the domestic
incumbent and transfers its proﬁts to the domestic representative agent.
In this case, the composite price of telecom services drops by 0.07 percent
and the telecom sector’s output grows by 18.31 percent. The entry of the
foreign provider leads to a slight expansion of the Tunisian economy, with
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increasing by 0.15 percent. Due to a
reduction of the consumer price index (CPI) by 0.19 percent, the economic
expansion is export-led, with aggregate exports growing 2.49 percent. The
beneﬁts of telecom liberalization accrue primarily to labor, with returns to
labor increasing by 0.37 percent and returns to capital increasing 0.10 per-
cent. Overall, household welfare (measured as Hicksian-neutral equivalent
variation) improves by 0.19 percent. This is a signiﬁcant increase in house-
hold welfare given that we are considering liberalization of just one sector,
and in a static context.
Scenario 2 in Table 2 also depicts a scenario where an equally eﬃcient for-
eign entrant competes in quantities with the domestic incumbent. Counter
to scenario 1, however, the foreign entrant shifts all of its proﬁts abroad in-
stead of to the domestic representative agent. Proﬁt shifting does not have a
signiﬁcant impact on the size and type of economic expansion. The telecom
sector expands 18.31 percent, while Tunisia’s real GDP and exports increase
by 0.14 percent and 2.49 percent, respectively. However, proﬁt shifting does
lead to a signiﬁcantly lower growth of household welfare. In contrast to the
0.19 percent growth of household welfare in the absence of proﬁt shifting
18(scenario 1), the negative proﬁt shifting eﬀect induces household welfare to
grow an insigniﬁcant 0.02 percent.
In scenario 3, a foreign entrant with a 15 percent lower marginal cost
competes in quantities with the domestic incumbent and transfers its proﬁts
to the domestic representative agent. The entry of a more eﬃcient foreign
provider leads to a more robust expansion of the Tunisian economy than the
entry of an equally eﬃcient foreign provider (scenario 1). In this case, the
composite price of telecom services drops by 0.15 percent and the telecom
sector’s output grows by 53.06 percent. The Tunisian economy has a more
solid economic growth, with real GDP increasing by 0.47 percent. Due to a
signiﬁcant reduction of the CPI by 0.59 percent, aggregate exports grow 6.99
percent. The beneﬁts of telecom liberalization once again accrue primarily
to labor, with returns to labor increasing by 0.80 percent and returns to
capital increasing 0.29 percent. In contrast to the 0.19 percent growth of
household welfare when an equally eﬃcient foreign provider enters (scenario
1), the positive eﬃciency eﬀect induces household welfare to grow a more
solid 0.65 percent.
In scenario 4, a more eﬃcient foreign entrant competes in quantities with
the domestic incumbent and shifts all of its proﬁts abroad. When compared
to scenario 3, proﬁt shifting once again only has a limited impact on the size
and type of economic expansion. The telecom sector expands 53.06 percent,
while Tunisia’s real GDP and exports increase by 0.44 percent and 6.99
percent, respectively. However, proﬁt shifting does lead to a signiﬁcantly
lower growth of household welfare. In contrast to the 0.65 percent growth of
household welfare in the absence of proﬁt shifting (scenario 3), the negative
proﬁt shifting eﬀect induces household welfare to grow only 0.26. When
compared to scenario 2, having a more eﬃcient foreign provider entering
the market leads to both a stronger GDP and household welfare growth
than having an equally eﬃcient foreign provider entering the market. While
household welfare only grows 0.02 percent when an equally eﬃcient foreign
provider enters the market (scenario 2), the positive eﬃciency eﬀect induces
household welfare to grow 0.26.
In scenario 5, an equally eﬃcient foreign entrant colludes with the domes-
tic incumbent by setting its price equal to the domestic monopolist’s original
price. The foreign entrant transfers its proﬁts to the domestic representative
agent. There are two new insights that this scenario provides. First, the
absence of a positive pro-competitive eﬀect implies that the economic ex-
pansion and welfare improvement is lower than when both equally eﬃcient
providers compete in quantities (scenario 1). Second, despite the fact that
both providers form a cartel by both charging the domestic monopoly price,
19there is still a small economic expansion and welfare gain due to the fact
that both providers sell diﬀerent varieties of telecom services (love-of-variety
eﬀect). As a result, Tunisia’s real GDP and household welfare grow by 0.11
percent and 0.15 percent respectively.
In scenario 6, an equally eﬃcient foreign entrant colludes with the domes-
tic incumbent and shifts all of its proﬁts abroad. The absence of a positive
pro-competitive eﬀect once again implies that the economic expansion and
welfare improvement is lower than when two equally eﬃcient providers com-
pete in quantities (scenario 2). The telecom sector expands 8.37 percent,
while Tunisia’s real GDP and exports increase by 0.08 percent and 1.19 per-
cent, respectively. In addition, when compared to scenario 5, proﬁt shifting
leads to a signiﬁcantly lower growth of household welfare than when proﬁts
are transferred to the domestic representative agent. In contrast to the 0.15
percent growth of household welfare in the absence of proﬁt shifting (sce-
nario 5), the negative proﬁt shifting eﬀect implies that household welfare
REDUCES 0.25 percent. This is an important result since it implies that
partial telecom liberalization in Tunisia does not necessarily improve the
country’s welfare.
In scenario 7, a more eﬃcient foreign entrant colludes with the domes-
tic incumbent and transfers its proﬁts to the domestic representative agent.
When compared to scenario 5, the entry of a more eﬃcient foreign provider
leads to a more robust expansion of the Tunisian economy and a positive
eﬃciency eﬀect on household welfare. The composite price of telecom ser-
vices drops by 0.04 percent and the telecom sector’s output grows by 8.47
percent. The Tunisian economy has a more solid economic growth, with real
GDP increasing by 0.36 percent and aggregate exports growing 1.50 percent.
Overall, household welfare improves by 0.54 percent. Due to the absence of
a pro-competitive eﬀect, the welfare gain is lower than in scenario 3 where
the domestic incumbent and the more eﬃcient foreign entrant compete in
quantities.
In scenario 8, a more eﬃcient foreign entrant colludes with the domestic
incumbent and shifts all of its proﬁts abroad. In this scenario, there is a
negative proﬁt shifting eﬀect, there is no positive pro-competitive eﬀect and
there is a positive eﬃciency eﬀect. As a result, the telecom sector expands
8.47 percent, while Tunisia’s real GDP and exports increase by 0.31 percent
and 1.50 percent, respectively. Once again, the fact that the foreign entrant
colludes with the domestic incumbent and shifts its proﬁts abroad implies
that Tunisia’s welfare declines by 0.21 percent.
From Table 2, the best-case scenario occurs when a more eﬃcient foreign
provider strategically competes in quantities with the domestic incumbent
20and transfers its proﬁts to the domestic representative agent (scenario 3).
The reason for this is straightforward: in this case, there is a positive eﬃ-
ciency and pro-competitive eﬀect, while there is no negative proﬁt-shifting
eﬀect. As a result, household welfare improves by 0.65 percent. Under the
worst-case scenario, an equally eﬃcient foreign provider colludes with the
domestic incumbent and shifts its proﬁts abroad (scenario 6). In this case,
there are no welfare-improving pro-competitive or eﬃciency eﬀects, while
the welfare-reducing proﬁt shifting eﬀect occurs. As a result, household
welfare is estimated to worsen 0.25 percent.
We can gain further insights into the the welfare diﬀerences between the
various counterfactual scenarios by decomposing the total welfare gains into
the four individual welfare eﬀects identiﬁed in Section 2: (i) love-of-variety
eﬀect, (ii) pro-competitive eﬀect, (iii) eﬃciency eﬀect and (iv) proﬁt shift-
ing eﬀect. We can calculate the size of these individual eﬀects by measuring
the change in welfare gain if an individual eﬀect is removed. Consider, for
example, scenario 4 where a more eﬃcient foreign entrant competes in quan-
tities with the domestic incumbent and transfers its proﬁts abroad. Under
this scenario, the pro-competitive eﬀect, eﬃciency eﬀect and proﬁt-shifting
eﬀect all are present. One can then determine the size of the proﬁt-shifting
eﬀect by calculating how much welfare goes down if the more eﬃcient foreign
entrant transfers its proﬁts to the domestic representative agent instead of
abroad (Scenario 3). It is straightforward to calculate that the proﬁt shifting
eﬀect is -0.39 percent. Similarly, one can determine that the pro-competitive
eﬀect is 0.47 percent by calculating how much welfare goes down if the more
eﬃcient foreign entrant colludes with the domestic incumbent instead of
competing (Scenario 8). The size of the eﬃciency eﬀect can be determined
to be 0.24 percent by calculating how much welfare goes down if the foreign
entrant is equally eﬃcient than the domestic incumbent instead of more ef-
ﬁcient (Scenario 2). Finally, if we subtract the sum of the pro-competitive
eﬀect, eﬃciency eﬀect and proﬁt-shifting eﬀect from the total welfare eﬀect,
we ﬁnd a residual eﬀect of -0.06. This residual eﬀect can be attributed to
two factors: the unambiguously positive love-of-variety eﬀect and interaction
eﬀects.
[Table 3 about here]
In Table 3, we have decomposed the total welfare eﬀect of each counterfac-
tual scenario into its individual eﬀects. The individual welfare eﬀects all
take on their expected signs: the pro-competitive and eﬃciency eﬀect are
21always positive and the proﬁt-shifting eﬀect is always negative. The size of
the eﬀects varies signiﬁcantly between scenarios. The pro-competitive eﬀect
ranges from 0.04% to 0.47%; the eﬃciency eﬀect from 0.04% to 0.46%; and
the proﬁt-shifting eﬀect from -0.75% to -0.17%. Since none of the eﬀects
dominate in magnitude, it is not possible to a single out an individual eﬀect
that should be targeted during telecom liberalization.
Telecom liberalization does not have a symmetric impact across indus-
tries, but rather induces some industries to expand and others to contract.
In Table 4, we depict the impact of telecom liberalization on sectoral out-
put. In order to ease comparison with Table 1, the industries are ranked in
descending order according to their telecom usage intensity. A ﬁrst thing to
note is that the impact of telecom liberalization on sectoral output is very
similar in sign and relative ranking across the counterfactual scenarios. In
all scenarios, “Business” is the biggest winner and “Restaurant” the biggest
loser from telecom liberalization. In all scenarios, the winners and losers
are ranked the same relative to one another. A second thing to note is
that ﬁve of the six fastest growing sectors are the ﬁve producer services sec-
tors (business, telecommunication, insurance, transportation and ﬁnance).
Real estate, repair, petroleum & gas, apparel and electric materials close oﬀ
the top ten expanding sectors. Generally, the expanding sectors are labor-
intensive industries with high telecom and producer-service intensity. The
three industries that contract the most are restaurant, leather and health &
education.
[Table 4 about here]
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In our counterfactual scenarios, we have made strong assumptions about
the share of proﬁts that the foreign provider shifts abroad. In scenarios 1,
3, 5 and 7, we assumed that the foreign provider shift none of their proﬁts
abroad; in scenarios 2, 4, 6 and 8, we assumed that the foreign provider shifts
all of its proﬁts abroad. To investigate the role that proﬁt shifting plays on
the impact of telecom liberalization, we have conducted a sensitivity analysis
in which we allow the share of proﬁts shifted abroad by the foreign entrant
to vary. In Table 5, we report the results of the sensitivity analysis. Note
that when the foreign ﬁrm shifts 0% of its proﬁts abroad, it corresponds to
the “proﬁt retention” scenarios in Table 2. When the foreign ﬁrm shifts 100
22percent of its proﬁts abroad, it corresponds to the “proﬁt shifting” scenarios
in Table 2.
[Table 5 about here]
The results in Table 5 demonstrate that the welfare gain of telecom liberal-
ization in Tunisia strictly decreases with the share of proﬁts that the foreign
provider shifts abroad. In all four columns, the welfare gain from telecom
liberalization decline as the share of proﬁts that the foreign provider shifts
abroad increases. The results depicted in Table 5 also shed light on the
minimum share of proﬁts that the foreign provider needs to shift abroad in
order to create a welfare loss. In a symmetric cartel, telecom liberalization
will be welfare reducing if more than 40 percent of the proﬁts are shifted
abroad. This implies that a welfare loss from telecom liberalization can oc-
cur even if only a moderate share of proﬁts is shifted abroad. Under an
asymmetric cartel, telecom liberalization will be welfare reducing if more
than 80 percent of proﬁts are shifted abroad.
Since we do not have suﬃcient information to determine the relative size
of the cartel wedge and cost ineﬃciency wedge, we have also made a strong
assumption that both wedges are equally weighted. To investigate the role of
the relative size of both wedges on our estimation results, we have presented
in table 6 the results of a second sensitivity analysis in which the share of
the cartel wedge in the total-price cost wedge is allowed to vary.
[Table 6 about here]
As is shown in Table 6, the cartel wedge share does not have a straightfor-
ward impact on welfare. In scenario 1, welfare increases as the cartel wedge
share increases; in scenario 3, welfare decreases as the cartel wedge share
increases; in scenario 5, welfare is not aﬀected by the cartel wedge share. To
understand the impact of the cartel wedge share on total welfare, it is there-
fore important to understand its impact on the individual welfare eﬀects.
First, an increase in the cartel wedge share implies that competitive foreign
entry can have a larger impact, thus leading to a larger pro-competitive ef-
fect. This can explain why in scenario 1 the welfare gains related to service
trade liberalization increases with the cartel wedge share, while in scenario
5, welfare remains unchanged. Second, since an increase in the cartel wedge
share automatically reduces the cost ineﬃciency wedge share, this implies
23that the eﬃciency eﬀect becomes smaller. This can explain why in scenario
7 the welfare gains related to service trade liberalization is unambiguously
decreasing with the cartel wedge share. Finally, the impact of the cartel
wedge share on the proﬁt-shifting eﬀect is unclear (see scenario 6).
4 Conclusion
Recent academic and policy studies have uncovered a link between the suc-
cess of service trade liberalization and issues of market structure and do-
mestic regulation. CGE studies, however, have faced signiﬁcant theoretical
hurdles to quantify these links. In this paper, we have set a ﬁrst step to
bridge these hurdles by introducing a method to incorporate a single imper-
fectly competitive service sector that can take on various market structures
into a standard CGE model. We have identiﬁed that service trade liberal-
ization can induce four welfare eﬀects in such a framework. It can induce
a positive love-of-variety eﬀect if services provided by domestic and foreign
providers are considered to be imperfect substitutes. It can lead to a positive
pro-competitive eﬀect if the two providers decide to compete in quantities
instead of colluding. It can induce a positive eﬃciency eﬀect if the foreign
providers are more eﬃcient than the domestic provider. Finally, it can lead
to a negative proﬁt-shifting eﬀect if the foreign providers shift their proﬁts
abroad. The fact that the welfare eﬀects have diﬀerent signs corresponds
to policy and academic concerns that the welfare impact of service trade
liberalization is ambiguous and depends on the adopted market structure
and country characteristics.
In the second part of the paper, we have introduced our framework into
a CGE model for Tunisia to quantify the welfare impact of allowing one
foreign provider to enter Tunisia’s telecommunication sector. According to
our conservative estimates, the welfare implications are clearly positive if
competition can be guaranteed between providers. Welfare gains can be
up to 0.65 percent if the foreign provider is 15 percent more eﬃcient than
the domestic incumbent and does not shift its proﬁts abroad. This can be
considered a signiﬁcant gain in household welfare, since we are modelling
the liberalization of a single sector in a static context. In contrast, telecom
liberalization will be welfare deteriorating if the foreign provider colludes
with the domestic incumbent and shifts a signiﬁcant portion of its proﬁts
abroad. Our results thus call for Tunisia among other developing countries to
step up its pro-competitive regulatory reforms while liberalizing its telecom
sector.
24By deriving the Lerner markup conditions for one imperfectly services
sector, our framework has set a ﬁrst step to analyze the role of market struc-
ture on the success of service trade liberalization. These Lerner markup
conditions do not easily generalize, however, to a framework with multiple
imperfectly competitive services sectors. Our approach thus cannot be used
to analyze the welfare impact of multi-sector service trade liberalization.
For multi-sector service trade liberalization, the approach suggested by Ko-
nan and Maskus (2006) continues to be the preferred approach. Future
research is needed to derive the Lerner markup conditions in a framework
with multiple imperfectly competitive services sectors.
Finally, with more information concerning ﬁxed costs and licensing fees
in a country’s service sector, we would be able to do a richer analysis of the
role of market structure in the success of a service trade liberalization in a
single sector. Speciﬁcally, we would be able to compare the welfare impact
of partial service trade liberalization where only few players are allowed to
enter a market to complete service trade liberalization where the service
sector becomes monopolistically competitive.
25Appendix A: General Equilibrium Lerner Markup
Condition
Hoﬀmann (2002) uses three equations to derive the general equilibrium
Lerner markup condition when a ﬁrm faces diﬀerent buyers. To simplify
notation in this appendix, we will drop the subscript j so that zi represents
the amount of services that provider j allocates to sector i.







where p is the price that the service provider charges for its services. By
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A second necessary equation states that changes in a provider’s total supply























dzi = 0 (A-6)
If we incorporate equations (A-4) and (A-5) into equation (A-7):




dz = 0 (A-7)









where θi = zi P
i zi. It can be useful to distinguish ﬁnal good usage from











where Φu equals the consumers’ demand elasticity for the provider’s services;
θu equals the share of the provider’s services that is sold to consumers; Φi
equals the demand elasticity for the provider’s telecom services by sector i
and θi equals the share of the provider’s services that is sold to sector i.
27Appendix B: Demand elasticity for intermediate in-
puts
As we have demonstrated in equation (8), the price of service pj can be









Since ﬁnal good output Yi and composite producer services PSi have a
Leontief technology, the cost share of Vi in the production of Yi is λv,i and













































Next, we need to derive
∂Y x
z,i
∂zj,i . This will depend on sector Yz’s market struc-




∂zj,i = 1. Under a Cournot oligopoly, each provider assumes that
the other providers will leave output unchanged when it changes its out-
put. In a cartel, all providers collaborate by setting prices to maximize joint
proﬁts. We assume that collaboration only can be enforced if the providers
collude set the same price pd = pf. Since there is a constant elasticity of
substitution between both services, this implies that all providers produce
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0 if monopolistic competition
The service provider’s price pj can be derived by inserting the equation
above and equation (B-5) into equation (B-1).
29Appendix C: Full Description of the CGE Model
In this Appendix, we will list the main equations of the model. For a full
list of all identities, please refer to Konan (2003).
Consider a CGE model with I − 1 perfectly competitive sectors that
produce output Yi and one imperfectly competitive producer service sector
that provides service Yz. Sectoral output is used both as an intermediate
good by sectors I and as a ﬁnal good by the representative consumer. We
denote intermediate good use by superscript x and ﬁnal good use by su-
perscript c. In the imperfectly competitive producer service sector Yz, N
service providers each produce a single diﬀerentiated service zj. The ser-
vice providers are not necessarily symmetric and can be both domestic and
foreign. Users perceive a constant elasticity of substitution between each
provider’s service, and we thus represent total industry output Yz as a CES













The elasticity of substitution between each variety is σ = 1
1−, where σ > 1.
Producer service sector Yz is one of a select group of H producer services
that positively aﬀect value-added productivity when used as an intermedi-
ate good (Markusen et al., 2005). Telecommunications, ﬁnance, insurance,
business services and transportation are generally considered to belong to
this category. To model this, we assume that industry i ∈ I’s composite
producer services PSi is a Leontief function of the share of producer service


































where the constant elasticity of substitution between value added and pro-
ducer services is ρ = 1
1−γ. We call function Vi composite value added of
industry i. The production function for all sectors except for Yz is approxi-
mated with Leontief technologies using composite intermediate inputs from





























In export sectors, the production for the domestic market Di is distinguished
from that for export EXi according to a two-tier nested constant elasticity













The second-tier CET-nest aggregates total exports, Xi, from exports by











In sector l, intermediate good demand xi,l and ﬁnal demand cl is diﬀeren-
tiated by country of origin. Domestic output Dl,i and Dl,c, and region r



























where composite intermediate imports IMl,i and ﬁnal imports IMl,C, are






















31In all sectors except for the telecommunications sector, ﬁrms face constant
returns to scale and behave competitively, implying that prices py,l equal
marginal cost cl, for output within sector l. The domestic policy environ-
ment is reﬂected by government-revenue-producing tariﬀs on sector l imports










y,l,rIMl,i,r + (wKKi + wLLi) (C-12)
In the imperfectly competitive telecom sector, the domestic and foreign ﬁrm
































































In the model, private household expenditures are determined by a represen-
tative agent with a multi-nested CES utility function. This allows the agent
to make separable multi-staged budget decisions. In the top-tier budgeting





i bi = 1. (C-18)
32The second budgeting stage involves the consumer deciding how much to
spend on domestic versus imported commodities, which is determined in
equations (C-8)-(C-11).
Private households receive income generated by returns to endowments
of labor, ¯ EL, and other value added, ¯ EK. Households receive monopoly rent
transfers from the domestic telecom incumbent πdzd and under some sce-
narios from the multinational telecom provider πmzm. Households support
a government budget deﬁcit, D, and engage in savings through exogenously















The model simpliﬁes the treatment of government and intertemporal deci-
sions. The government is assumed to spend based on a ﬁxed real income,
with preferences reﬂecting those of households. A lump-sum tax adjusts

















Similarly, real private investment in each sector, Ii, is exogenously ﬁxed at
the benchmark level.
As noted above, import and export prices are exogenous following the
small-economy assumption. The real current account balance, B, is exoge-
nously given at international prices and is assumed to be exogenous. That is,
the volume of trade adjusts endogenously to ensure a constant real current


































LLF − rFKF − πmzm) (C-22)
It is important to note that key identities hold as the optimizing behavior
of agents assures that income will equal expenditures. Market clearance
is achieved in each goods market, each factor market and the total supply




al,iYl + Gi + IF
i + II
i + Ci (C-23)
33X
i
Ki = ¯ EK;
X
i
Li = ¯ EL (C-24)




ai,l(1 + vi)Yl + ˜ pC
i Di,C + ˜ pIF
i DF
i,I + ˜ pG






(1 + τV,i + ui + ti,r)pim
i,r(IMi,C,r + IMi,G,r + IMF
i,I,r)
In this Arrow-Debreu type model, Walras’ law is satisﬁed and, given a nu-
meraire, a unique set of real prices is determined in each scenario.
34Table C-1: List of Variables
B Current-account balance
ci Index of marginal cost of production
Ci Private consumption
D Government budget deﬁcit
Dij Domestic sales in sector i used by j
e Real exchange rate (price index for foreign exchange)




i Fixed capital formation and inventory
IMijr Imports in sector i from region r used in j
KF Net payments on foreign capital holdings
Ki Non-labor (capital) inputs
Li Domestic labor inputs
pi Domestic producer price index
p
j
i Price index of domestic goods used by j
pir Producer price index for goods exported to region r
pijr Domestic price index for imports in sector i from region r used in j
˜ pi Composite price index for total domestic supply
˜ pij Composite price index (weighted average of home and imported prices)
PSi Producer services
Si Supply on domestic market
U Utility of representative consumer
Vi Value added
wK, wL Factor price indexes
xij Composite intermediate input of j into i
Yi Output of good i
ZD Telecom services provided by domestic incumbent
ZM Telecom services provided by foreign entrant
θi Share of total telecom services used by i
ρ Elasticity of substitution between value added and producer services
τV i Endogenous tax rate on value added
φi Elasticity of demand for telecom user i
35Table C-2: List of Parameters
αi Labor share of value added in sector i






ζi Transformation elasticity between domestic and exported output
κi Transformation elasticity on exports between regions
λi Service resource-using barriers on output (λi = 0 for non-service sectors)
µj Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported intermediates
ξj Substitution elasticity between domestic and imported consumption
πi Telecom rents for service provider i
σ Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign telecom services
ψi Armington elasticity on imports between regions
¯ EK, ¯ EL Endowments of capital and labor
pim
ir Price of imports from region r
pex
ir Price of exports to region r
rF Price of foreign capital payments
tir Tariﬀ rate on imports from region r (tri = 0 for service sectors)
ui Resource-using services border barriers (ui = 0 for non-service sectors)
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Figure 2: Fixed Line and Mobile Phone Penetration Rates (per 1000 people)
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Figure 3: Nesting Structure of Tunisia CGE Model
42Table 1: Telecom Usage, Producer Service Usage, and Labor Intensity by
Industry
Telecom Telecom Producer Producer Labor Sectoral
input input service service share output
as share of input input of value
sectoral as share of added
output sectoral
output
000 dinars % 000 dinars % % 000 dinars
Business 15 199 5.1 24 712 8.4 47.2 295 460
Commerce 79 572 3.9 135 732 6.6 100.0 2 044 425
Hotel 16 778 2.1 30 978 3.9 22.6 803 168
Finance 15 261 2.0 30 732 3.9 34.0 778 408
Health and education 10 060 1.9 19 531 3.6 26.4 539 356
Telecommunications 4 047 1.3 11 244 3.5 30.7 321 980
Transportation 21 095 1.2 170 678 10.1 50.1 1 695 205
Insurance 1 107 1.0 51 144 46.5 34.0 110 009
Real Estate 1 050 1.0 13 579 12.5 4.4 108 936
Public sector 32 893 0.9 64 472 1.7 100.0 3 857 265
Repair 2 478 0.8 3 402 1.1 21.9 314 355
Water 1 039 0.7 8 564 6.0 52.6 142 448
Apparel 25 624 0.7 68 780 1.9 49.6 3 530 881
Autoparts and repair 167 0.7 714 2.8 100.0 25 131
Petroleum and gas 8 905 0.6 15 021 1.0 7.7 1 433 889
Other sectors 1 025 0.5 1 677 0.8 37.5 210 961
Cement 4 977 0.4 19 922 1.8 39.9 1 106 602
Paper, books, records 1 861 0.4 8 460 2.0 35.7 433 756
Metal work 1 755 0.4 8 292 1.7 44.4 475 533
Minerals 675 0.3 5 822 3.0 84.3 195 339
Machines and equipment 750 0.3 3 561 1.5 83.6 232 134
Electric materials 1 251 0.3 5 044 1.2 30.3 410 115
Electronics 613 0.3 2 775 1.1 82.9 242 991
Construction 5 914 0.2 99 086 4.2 73.3 2 368 369
Electricity 1 340 0.2 6 425 1.1 30.9 562 236
Leather 1 204 0.2 7 114 1.3 30.8 554 517
Household applances 258 0.2 1 032 0.9 41.6 119 174
Non-ferrous metals 748 0.2 5 019 1.3 70.2 390 537
Restaurant 1 855 0.2 2 485 0.3 22.6 981 269
Woodwork 1 087 0.2 19 664 3.4 27.8 576 297
Plastics 466 0.2 2 177 0.9 29.8 247 838
Chemicals 3 460 0.2 84 342 4.4 31.2 1 917 992
Food 4 493 0.1 23 377 0.6 36.4 3 676 665
Automobiles and trucks 291 0.1 6 460 1.7 34.7 387 974
Agriculture 0 0.0 7 071 0.3 12.0 2 778 914
Institut National de la Statistique, 1998, Les Comptes de la Nation Base 1983, agregats et tableaux
43Table 2: Telecom Liberalization Scenarios
Foreign Entry with DUOPOLY Market Structure (% change)
symmetric costs asymmetric costs
proﬁt retention proﬁt shifting proﬁt retention proﬁt shifting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Telecom Sector Indicators
Telecom output 18.31 18.31 53.06 53.06
Composite telecom price -0.07 -0.07 -0.15 -0.15
Macroeconomic Indicators
Household welfare (EV) 0.19 0.02 0.65 0.26
Output, real 0.15 0.14 0.47 0.44
Consumer price index -0.19 -0.16 -0.59 -0.55
Aggregate exports 2.49 2.49 6.99 6.99
Aggregate imports 0.89 0.89 2.29 2.29
Return to capital 0.10 0.10 0.29 0.29
Return to labor 0.37 0.37 0.80 0.80
Foreign Entry with CARTEL Market Structure (% change)
symmetric costs asymmetric costs
proﬁt retention proﬁt shifting proﬁt retention proﬁt shifting
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Telecom Sector Indicators
Telecom output 8.37 8.37 8.47 8.47
Composite telecom price -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
Macroeconomic Indicators
Household welfare (EV) 0.15 -0.25 0.54 -0.21
Output, real 0.11 0.08 0.36 0.31
Consumer price index -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Aggregate exports 1.19 1.19 1.50 1.50
Aggregate imports 0.46 0.46 0.67 0.67
Return to capital 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































45Table 4: Impact of Telecom Liberalization on Sectoral Output (% change)
Duopoly Cartel
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
costs costs costs costs
proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt
retention shifting retention shifting retention shifting retention shifting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Business 21.67 21.67 56.50 56.50 10.22 10.22 10.40 10.40
Commerce -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.28
Hotel -0.24 -0.24 -0.70 -0.70 -0.07 -0.07 0.12 0.12
Finance 3.13 3.13 7.82 7.82 1.54 1.54 1.79 1.79
Health and education -0.47 -0.47 -1.36 -1.36 -0.14 -0.14 0.22 0.22
Telecommunication 18.31 18.31 53.06 53.06 8.37 8.37 8.47 8.47
Transportation 9.01 9.01 22.87 22.87 4.32 4.32 4.55 4.55
Insurance 11.67 11.67 29.95 29.95 5.55 5.55 5.76 5.76
Real estate 4.82 4.82 11.52 11.52 2.72 2.72 4.79 4.79
Public sector 0.19 0.19 0.36 0.36 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09
Repair 1.91 1.91 4.80 4.80 0.93 0.93 1.07 1.07
Water 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.08 0.19 0.19
Apparel 0.76 0.76 2.60 2.60 0.39 0.39 0.85 0.85
Autoparts and repair 0.21 0.21 0.61 0.61 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.15
Petroleum and gas 1.73 1.73 4.24 4.24 0.86 0.86 0.97 0.97
Other sectors 0.38 0.38 0.95 0.95 0.23 0.23 0.51 0.51
Cement 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08
Paper, books, records 0.26 0.26 0.64 0.64 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.37
Metal work 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.23 0.23
Minerals -0.29 -0.29 -0.73 -0.73 -0.09 -0.09 0.17 0.17
Machines and equipment 0.44 0.44 1.01 1.01 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.26
Electric materials 0.58 0.58 1.17 1.17 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Electronics 0.47 0.47 1.13 1.13 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.10
Construction 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.28 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08
Electricity 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.32 0.10 0.10 0.26 0.26
Leather -0.50 -0.50 -1.42 -1.42 -0.17 -0.17 0.15 0.15
Household appliances -0.22 -0.22 -0.72 -0.72 -0.04 -0.04 0.25 0.25
Non-ferrous metals 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.12
Restaurant -0.62 -0.62 -1.78 -1.78 -0.20 -0.20 0.23 0.23
Woodwork -0.19 -0.19 -0.56 -0.56 -0.04 -0.04 0.16 0.16
Plastics 0.25 0.25 0.59 0.59 0.16 0.16 0.39 0.39
Chemicals -0.13 -0.13 -0.39 -0.39 -0.01 -0.01 0.25 0.25
Food -0.43 -0.43 -1.25 -1.25 -0.14 -0.14 0.18 0.18
Automobiles and trucks 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.28
Agriculture -0.40 -0.40 -1.15 -1.15 -0.12 -0.12 0.18 0.18
46Table 5: Senstivitiy Analysis — Impact of Proﬁt Shifting on Total Welfare
Eﬀect
share of foreign Duopoly Cartel
provider’s proﬁts
shifted abroad (%) symmetric costs asymmetric costs symmetric costs asymmetric costs
0 0.19 0.65 0.15 0.54
10 0.17 0.60 0.11 0.47
20 0.16 0.55 0.07 0.40
30 0.14 0.50 0.03 0.32
40 0.12 0.46 -0.01 0.24
50 0.11 0.42 -0.05 0.17
60 0.09 0.39 -0.09 0.09
70 0.07 0.35 -0.13 0.02
80 0.06 0.32 -0.17 -0.06
90 0.04 0.30 -0.21 -0.13
100 0.02 0.26 -0.25 -0.21
Table 6: Sensitivity Analysis — Impact of Wedge Decomposition on Total
Welfare Eﬀect
share of Duopoly Cartel
cartel wedge
in total symmetric costs asymmetric costs symmetric costs asymmetric costs
price-cost
wedge (%) proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt proﬁt
retention shifting retention shifting retention shifting retention shifting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
30 0.16 0.03 1.19 0.69 0.15 -0.13 0.78 -0.04
40 0.17 0.03 0.84 0.41 0.15 -0.22 0.67 -0.14
50 0.19 0.02 0.65 0.26 0.15 -0.25 0.54 -0.21
60 0.21 0.02 0.52 0.16 0.15 -0.24 0.40 -0.22
70 0.22 0.02 0.43 0.11 0.15 -0.23 0.31 -0.21
80 0.24 0.02 0.36 0.07 0.15 -0.21 0.24 -0.21
90 0.26 0.03 0.31 0.05 0.15 -0.20 0.19 -0.20
100 0.28 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.15 -0.19 0.15 -0.19
47